NATO and the Trump Challenge: Navigating the Alliance’s Priorities in a Shifting Climate and Security Landscape

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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte during an official visit to Clay Barracks in Wiesbaden, Germany in 2024. Photo: NATO

The potential impact of a second Trump administration on NATO has attracted substantial analysis, with some experts speculating that Trump’s demands — though as yet undefined — could threaten the alliance in its current format. While a complete U.S. withdrawal from NATO seems unlikely, a second Trump administration would almost certainly push for structural changes within NATO, advocating for a multi-tiered framework where benefits align with contributions and encouraging European members to take a more active role in their own defence; a prospect that has been dubbed by some as the starting process of Europe’s rebirth.

A Trump administration would also likely attempt to reorient NATO’s priorities, presenting an understated but consequential challenge: the potential conflict between Trump’s domestic climate policies and NATO’s commitment to addressing climate change. While Trump’s specific climate agenda remains unconfirmed, his first-term policies and recent campaign rhetoric hint at a probable course. Regardless of specifics, his climate-skeptical approach contrasts sharply with NATO’s ambitious climate goals which include decarbonisation and carbon neutrality by 2050. The real challenge for NATO, therefore, lies in preparing to constructively engage with an American administration that may be resistant to its climate-oriented goals rather than in averting a total US departure from NATO.

How a Second Trump Presidency Might Challenge NATO

NATO’s climate adaptation strategy rests on two main objectives: understanding the rapid onset of climate-related crises and developing the resources necessary to address the root causes of climate change. In this way, the alliance addresses climate change both strategically and operationally. Since NATO and its adversaries are yet to master the art of effective operation in extreme environmental conditions, the race to adapt will yield significant strategic advantages. A second Trump administration, however, could exacerbate existing divisions within NATO regarding the importance of climate change.

Some NATO members still view climate change as a distant, and not an immediate, threat. Some officials dismiss its relevance to NATO’s daily operations all together while others fear that prioritising climate issues could reduce operational effectiveness. Germany and Turkey are two examples neither of whom have fully incorporated climate change into their military planning and/or security assessments. Thus, a Trump presidency would not necessarily disrupt a perfectly unified stance within NATO but instead could deepen existing divisions. The anticipated US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and subsequent push for increased fossil fuel production, moreover, could potentially discourage other NATO members from pursuing costly emissions reductions.

Strategically, a divergence on climate policy would allow adversaries to gain a leadership role in climate mitigation efforts, using this to enhance their geopolitical influence. In the Arctic, for example, climate change is reshaping security dynamics. NATO’s ability to respond effectively to new challenges in the Arctic will be hampered if the US deprioritises climate adaptation just as China, in ever closer cooperation with Russia, is increasing its regional presence and scientific undertaking in the region. Equally consequential, NATO risks losing some support from environmentally conscious publics if key members fail to commit to carbon reduction targets.

There is also the potential for the US under Trump to deprioritise funding for NATO’s climate-related projects and partnerships including initiatives under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program which finances climate resilience and research efforts in NATO partner countries. Not only such initiatives present an extremely effective public diplomacy tool for the alliance but they have also helped turn NATO’s climate goals into action while simultaneously facilitating increased understanding and collaboration between NATO and partner states. Cuts to these funds would weaken NATO’s ability to respond proactively to climate-related security threats thereby leaving it less prepared for intensified global competition and heightened polarisation.

Conclusion

Within NATO, there are varying opinions on prioritising climate change and other security threats, and the consensus-based nature of the alliance can hinder rapid progress on emerging issues. Some NATO members perceive climate change as distinct from traditional security concerns, potentially relegating it to a lower priority. This perception is misguided and is best evident in the fact that closer Russian and Chinese cooperation in the Arctic, while not brought about by the climate change, is partially facilitated by the effects of the climate change. Were it not for the impact of the climate change and the subsequent opening of the Arctic sea-lanes, for instance, there would have been less incentive for Beijing and Moscow to forge a partnership.

As NATO implements its climate adaptation roadmap and strive to become “the leading international organisation for understanding and adapting to security impacts of climate change”, it will need to manage the unequal impacts of climate change on different allies and the potential demands for resources from more climate-vulnerable partners. It is still unclear how, or if, Article 5 would apply in cases of major environmental crisis/emergencies, or how Trump’s envisioned multi-tier alliance would handle such threats. As such, there is an urgent need for the alliance’s leadership to articulate its own initiatives and proposal on these issues before the inauguration so it can shape the debate and discussions when they occur instead of simply reacting to whatever policy proposal the Trump Administration ends up coming up with. In doing so, it is worth keeping in mind Mr. Trump’s personality and his unconventional style of doing politics; that is to say, NATO’s secretary general might have a higher chance of success if he focus more on cultivating positive personal relations with Trump and less on bureaucratic and institutional engagements.